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ARTICLES
REDRESSING WRONGS OF THE BLAMELESSLY




Until recently, our society has refused to acknowledge and recog-
nize the widespread incidence of incest. Childhood sexual abuse,1
especially incestuous abuse,2 has reached unconscionable propor-
tions. A representative study by Dr. Diana E. H. Russell deter-
mined that as many as thirty-eight percent of the female popula-
tion have experienced sexual molestation by the age of eighteen
years.3 Formerly, psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, and other
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1. According to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children the legal definition
of sexual abuse is "sexual acts involving a person responsible for the child's welfare." NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, SELECTED STATE LEGISLATION: A GUmE
FOR EFFECTIVE STATE LAWS TO PROTECT CHILDREN 35 (2d ed. 1989).
2. For purposes of this article, the terms incest and incestuous abuse are defined as secre-
tive, exploitative sexual contact between adult male relatives in positions of authority and
trust, and female child relatives under the age of 18 who have sustained some physical,
psychological or emotional injury as a result of the secretive, exploitative sexual contact.
Because most of the data available on incest supports this definition, this article is prepared
from that perspective.
3. Diana E.H. Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial
Sexual Abuse of Female Children, in HANDBOOK ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 19, 25 (L.
Walker ed. 1988). Dr. Russell's study of 930 women was conducted in San Francisco in 1978.
The survey found that of the 38% of women who had suffered some form of child molesta-
tion, 16% suffered intrafamilial child sexual abuse. Dr. Russell defined intrafamilial sexual
abuse as "any kind of exploitative sexual contact that occurred between relatives, no matter
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investigators who did discover the severe effects of childhood in-
cestuous abuse on adult women reacted by suppressing and deny-
ing their findings.4
Although incest is now confronted in our society, the unique
physical, psychological, and emotional traumas suffered by female
child victims are often not treated. Typically, the criminal justice
system seeks to penalize and imprison the guilty fathers, while so-
cial service agencies either remove the daughter from her home, or
work to correct and improve the family dynamics.5
Social service professionals who specialize in treating the dys-
functional family, and criminal justice professionals who adminis-
ter state sanctions, fail to treat the daughter's unique injuries.6
Victims then reach adulthood with long-term deleterious effects. 7
These effects include, but are certainly not limited to depression,
poor self-esteem, and self-destructive behavior including self-muti-
lation and suicide. A victim may also suppress anger and feel hos-
how distant the relationship." Id. at 22. Consensual sexual contact between persons with an
age differential of five years was not included in the study. Id.
Five other studies conducted between 1940 and 1978, some by such noted figures as Al-
fred Kinsey and David Finkelhor, corroborate Dr. Russell's findings that from one-fifth to
one-third of all women had a childhood sexual encounter with an adult male, and that be-
tween 4% and 12% of all women had a childhood sexual encounter with an adult male
relative. JUDITH L. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 12 (1981).
4. Russell, supra note 3, at 7-18. For instance, Dr. Sigmund Freud theorized that female
patients fantasized about sexual seduction by their fathers. He noted that "there was the
astonishing thing that in every case... blame was laid on perverse acts by the father, and
realization of the unexpected frequency of [female] hysteria, in every case of which the same
thing applied, though it was hardly credible that perverted acts against children were so
general." See Martha J. Zackin, Note, The Discovery Rule and Father-Daughter Incest: A
Legislative Response, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 945 n.48 (1988) (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, THE
ORIGINS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 215-16 (1954)).
The authors expressly recognize that not all perpetrators of incest are male and not all
victims are female. However, throughout this article the authors address the problem of
incest between male perpetrators and female victims. Therefore, as used herein, the term
"father(s)" will be used to refer to male members of the family whether natural fathers,
step-fathers, foster fathers, adoptive fathers, grandfathers, uncles, brothers, or other adult
male members of the child's family. The term "daughter(s)" will be used to refer to the
female child victims whether natural daughters, step-daughters, foster daughters, adopted
daughters, granddaughters, nieces, sisters or other female child victims within the family.
5. See Gregory F. Long, Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse: Criminal Cases and Neglect
and Dependency Cases, in HANDBOOK ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 137.
6. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. See generally Phyllis Coleman, Incest: A
Proper Definition Reveals the Need for A Different Legal Response, 49 Mo. L. REv. 251,
269-270 (1984).
7. David Finkelhor & Angela Browne, Assessing the Long-Term Impact of Child Sexual
Abuse: A Review and Conceptualization, in HANDBOOK ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN,
supra note 3, at 55.
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tility toward her mother because the victim holds her mother re-
sponsible for not preventing the abuse. In addition, a victim may
harbor feelings of guilt and shame because she believes she is re-
sponsible for her own victimization.8 The victim often possesses
feelings of isolation and stigma; has difficulty in trusting others,
especially men; and experiences problems with intimacy evidenced
by marital and relationship problems. Furthermore, victims have a
tendency toward revictimization. The situations they often find
themselves in range from prostitution to a high incidence of rape;
substance abuse, including alcoholism and drug addiction; sexual
dysfunctioning including frigidity, a fear of sexual contact, and an
inability to tolerate sexual arousal; and multiple personality disor-
ders.9 The nature and degree of the injury is influenced by the vic-
tim's age at the time of the assaults, the degree and severity of the
abuse, and the length of the abuse.
Traditional legal obstacles have often prevented civil redress for
incest related injuries, even though courts now recognize the severe
effects on adult women. The parental immunity doctrine, consent,
and statutes of limitation have in many instances blocked attempts
to redress these injuries. Time has seen the partial erosion of these
defenses, and the doctrine of parental tort immunity has been ab-
rogated in most states.10 In jurisdictions where the doctrine has not
been completely abrogated, exceptions have been made for sexual
abuse." Additionally, the inadequacy of a child's consent has been
8. Id. at 56-58.
9. Id.; see also BULKLEY, NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PRO-
TECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES, 3-4 (ABA Rev. ed. 1981);
MARY DE YOUNo, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN (1982); Shirley J. Asher, The Ef-
fects of Childhood Sexual Abuse: A Review of the Issues and Evidence, in HANDBOOK ON
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, 6-10; Lusk and Waterman, Effects of Sexual
Abuse on Children, in SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILDREN 101-11 (1986); Zackin, supra note
4, at 947-50.
10. LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND
SEXUAL ABUSE, app. F (1988).
11. See, e.g., Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989) (doctrine of parental immunity
abrogated for sexual abuse cases). The Supreme Court of Alabama originally adopted the
parental immunity doctrine in Owens v. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co., 177 So. 133 (Ala.
1937), and had most recently considered the doctrine in Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164
(Ala. 1984). In Hill the court refused to abrogate the doctrine in a minor's wrongful death
action to recover against his father's estate, and expressly deferred to the legislature to mod-
ify or abolish the doctrine. Id. However, when the Hurst court was presented with the inces-
tuous abuse claims of Melissa Hurst against her stepfather, the court noted that the paren-
tal immunity doctrine was a judicially created doctrine that was "not exclusively a
legislative issue and [thus it could be] judicially qualified." Hurst, 539 So. 2d at 266. Be-
cause the legislature had failed to act after Hill the court ruled that "[t]o leave children who
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underscored by statutory 2 as well as case law.' 3 Thus, the statute
of limitations remains the primary obstacle to adult women who
attempt to redress injuries caused by childhood incest.
Possibly of greatest importance to the judiciary in addressing
tort actions by adult survivors of incest is an understanding that
the incest victim frequently exhibits the symptoms of Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). 4 PTSD is a "mental disorder in
which the victim avoids situations that stimulate recall of trau-
matic events or experiences." 5 When an adult survivor"' of incest
are victims of such wrongful, intentional, heinous acts without a right to redress those
wrongs in a civil action is unconscionable, especially where the harm to the family fabric has
already occurred through that abuse" and thus created a limited exception to the doctrine
in sexual abuse cases. Id.
The parental immunity doctrine also has been partially abrogated in Tennessee for sexual
abuse claims pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Wil-
son v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1984). Christine Wilson filed suit through her mother
against her adoptive father, Richard Wilson, for sexual assaults between the ages of 8 and
11. The court concluded that the "common law parental immunity rule holds only insofar as
it subserves the domestic peace and tranquility of the family, and '[w]here the reason fails
the rule should not apply."' Id. at 1005 (citing Brown v. Selby, 332 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.
1960)). Thus the doctrine was abrogated because "[s]uch an act of gross misconduct would
be so destructive of a family's parental relations as to eliminate the ... public policy be-
hind the parental immunity rule, and fully warrant this court's" abrogation of the rule in
cases of sexual abuse. Id.
The Supreme Court of Utah also has refused to allow a parental immunity defense in an
action brought by an adopted daughter against her stepfather for sexual assault and abuse,
which occurred from age 9 until the daughter left home at the age of 16. In Elkington v.
Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980), the court noted that parental immunity was recognized at
common law, but held that "there is no foundation in our law, statutory or decisional, upon
which to base parental immunity against a suit [for sexual abuse]; and we don't think there
should be." Id. at 40.
But see Barnes v. Barnes, 566 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) in which an Indiana
appellate court held that the parental immunity rule remains valid. The court overturned a
jury award of $3.25 million in compensatory and punitive damages against a father for the
repeated rape of his fifteen-year-old daughter over a four-day period. The court noted its
concern that recognition of a child's tort against a parent would damage family unity and
concluded that prior case law ruling which states that the parental immunity rule preserves
the public interest by preserving family tranquility is still applicable today.
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-3 cmt. (Repl. Vol. 1982) (a girl under the age of consent
cannot consent to incest so that uncorroborated testimony can result in a conviction); see
also L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Incest-Consent as Element, 36 A.L.R. 2d 1299 (1954).
13. See, e.g., Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (consent is not a defense
because plaintiff was a minor and thus incapable of giving consent when the acts of abuse
occurred); see also 6 Am. Jun. 2D Assault and Battery § 156 (1963).
14. The essential feature of PTSD "is the development of characteristic symptoms follow-
ing a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual human
experience." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.81 (3d ed. 1980). The characteristic symptoms of depression guilt,
and anxiety are common and may result in self-defeating behavior or suicidal actions. Id.
15. Carolyn B. Handler, Note, Civil Claims of Adults Molested As Children: Maturation
of Harm and the Statute of Limitations Hurdle, 15 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 709, 717 (1987).
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develops PTSD, she may subconsciously avoid any remembrance
of the childhood sexual assaults, and thus not recognize the causal
connection between unremembered assaults and adult physical,
emotional and psychological problems. 17 This inability to re-expe-
rience the trauma of the incestuous abuse may prevent the victim
from realizing the fact and cause of her adult injuries.' 8 When the
survivor is able to relate her injuries to the childhood assaults, she
may attempt to seek civil damages through traditional tort theo-
ries. However, by the time she has recognized the fact and cause of
her injuries, and made the leap from victim to survivor, she is usu-
ally beyond the statutorily prescribed limitations period. The sur-
vivor will, therefore, often be precluded from pursuing her cause of
action. Our traditional legal system is not amenable to delayed
claims, even when the plaintiff may not have been fully aware of
her cause of action within the prescribed time frame.
Survivors of incestuous abuse often suppress memories of the as-
saults; thus, they may not recognize the source and cause of their
injuries until many years after the abuse has ceased. The judiciary
must be made aware of the lingering and debilitating injuries that
result from incest. Civil claims for damages from incestuous abuse
deserve application of the discovery doctrine. Humane justice and
"notions of fundamental fairness"' 9 dictate that the tort of inces-
tuous abuse be recognized by the judiciary as an effective means of
compensating the "blamelessly ignorant"2 0 victim for injuries in-
flicted in childhood. Such a tort should make an express provision
for an exception to the statute of limitations when the plaintiff,
due to the extent and nature of her injuries, has suppressed her
memory of the occurrence of the incest, and thus has failed to rec-
16. Women who were incestuously abused as children must learn to confront the abuse,
its aftereffects, and look upon themselves as "survivors" instead of "victims." An adult wo-
man will not be able to develop a positive self-image and fully recover from the trauma of
the abuse until she has made this transformation from victim to survivor. See HERmAN,
supra note 3, ch. 11, see also Christine A. Courtois & Judith E. Sprei, Retrospective Incest
Therapy for Women, in HANDBOOK ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 271-72.
17. Courtois & Sprei, supra note 16, at 717-18.
18. Id.; see Zackin, supra note 4, at 947-49.
19. Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 231 (Wash. 1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting) superseded
by statute as stated in North Coast Air Servs. Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 759 P.2d 405 (Wash.
1988).
20. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (the Court termed the phrase "blame-
less ignorance" to apply to Mr. Tom Urie when it ruled that the discovery doctrine applied
to Mr. Urie's claims for silicosis injuries brought under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act).
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ognize the causal connection to her adult injuries within the limita-
tions period prescribed for traditional torts.2
II. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF INCEST
The American Humane Society's Clearinghouse on Child Abuse
estimates that 60,000 to 100,000 children are victims of incest an-
nually in the United States.22 This ultimately affects ten percent to
fourteen percent of all American families annually.23 Sexual abuse
is also the fastest growing form of reported child abuse.24 Because
the majority of cases go unreported each year,25 these figures still
do not reflect the actual incidents of incestuous abuse. In Dr. Rus-
sell's random survey of adult women who had suffered childhood
incest, only two percent had reported the abuse to authorities.26
Similarly, the Child Advocate Association of Chicago estimates
that only three percent of incestuous abuse cases are reported an-
nually.27 Because victims fear reprisal from their fathers or separa-
tion from their families, they do not report the assaults to the au-
thorities, or even to close family members or friends. The victims
unconsciously choose the horror and fear of continued abuse over
the unknown consequences that will result from exposing their
abusive fathers. Thus the full extent of the traumatic problem of
incest is not known.
A. The Requirement for Secrecy
The childhood requirement for secrecy constitutes one of the
greatest forces behind the adult survivor's failure to timely recog-
nize the extent and cause of her injuries and subsequently her fail-
ure to timely act in pursuing her civil legal remedies within the
prescribed limitations periods for personal injuries. 2s The judiciary
21. For additional information regarding the problems of the statute of limitations bar-
ring civil actions for incest, see Note, Ann M. Hagen, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for
Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. REV. 355, 355-82 (1991); see also
Jocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an Equi-
table Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189 (1991).
22. Waterman and Rusk, Scope of the Problem, in SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHLDREN,
supra note 9, at 5.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Russell, supra note 3, at 35.
27. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 164.
28. DE YOUNG, supra note 9, at 4.
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needs to understand the victim's fear of exposing her tormentor,
because the impact on the child of this absolute requirement of
secrecy must never be discounted.29 When children divulge the se-
cret of incest the effect may be as traumatic as tolerating the as-
saults. For example, in a study of judges involved in rape cases,
eighty-four percent of the judges responded that children who tes-
tified in court were emotionally traumatized. 30 When a child must
testify against a parent it is an especially traumatic event.31 To
avoid this public trauma, victims of incest do not reveal the as-
saults to persons who could help them stop the assaults and help
them redress their injuries.
This conspiracy of silence becomes overwhelming and daughters
are unable to speak out against their fathers, even after the abuse
has ceased, because the parental domination and coercion totally
overpower the victim.3 2 When the incest lasts for a period of years,
which is not uncommon, the daughter learns to believe that she is
responsible for the assaults, and that the incest must be hidden
from everyone at any cost.33
Fathers, because of fear of criminal punishment or public ostra-
cism, play the most important role in convincing their minor
daughters that silence must be maintained and that no one must
know of their special secret.3 4 This "corruption of the parental
love" is, quite possibly, the greatest harm of all because the father
abuses not only his daughter's body, but also the trust and reliance
that she has placed in him.35 Thus the individual who should be
responsible for protecting his daughter from sexual assault and
bodily injury is ultimately responsible for her injuries. He com-
pounds the harm by so deeply imbedding requirements of secrecy,
29. Melissa G. Salten, Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the
Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 196-99 (1984).
30. Lusk and Waterman, Effects of Sexual Abuse on Children, in SEXUAL ABUSE OF
YOUNG CHLDREN: EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 109 (1986).
31. Whetstone, Alabama Law Institute, Legal Aspects of Child Abuse and Neglect, in
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEC. A COMMUNITY APPROACH 76 (1978).
32. See generally SANDRA BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST (1978).
The requirement for secrecy is paramount to maintaining the incestuous relationship. The
father knows the act is wrongful and illegal, and will use any method of coercion to assure
his daughter's silence and availability. The term "conspiracy of silence" refers not only to
the requirement that the child maintain absolute secrecy but also refers to the silence
within the professional community that becomes necessary as a means of self-protection
when treating incestuous families. Id. at 8-9.
33. See id. at 32-34.
34. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 88.
35. Id. at 4.
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that his daughter cannot remember the fact and cause of her adult
injuries.
Incest most often occurs in a very patriarchal family situation in
which the father exercises absolute dominion and control over his
minor daughter and his financially dependent family members. 36 A
domineering father may use any one of many techniques to en-
courage his daughter to remain silent about abuse. As long as in-
cest remains a secret and other family members or authorities are
not alerted to the assaults, the father is assured that he will not be
held accountable and that his daughter will remain continually
available to him.37
One method fathers use to maintain secrecy is an attempt to
convince their daughters that the incestuous relationship is nor-
mal, necessary and healthy, though subject to misunderstanding by
others.38 Further, he often persuades the daughter that she, not
her father, is to blame for the abuse, and that if she reveals the
special secret, dire consequences will befall the entire family. Addi-
tionally, the father may warn the daughter that if she betrays him
to the authorities, he will be put in jail, and the family will be
without food, clothing, and shelter.39 Further, he may warn his
daughter that if she tells her mother, her mother will suffer a ner-
vous breakdown,40 that the parents will divorce, or that she (the
daughter) will be separated from the rest of her family and sent to
a foster home, all because of the evils she has committed.41 Unfor-
tunately, in these patriarchal families the mother may be incapable
of recognizing the abuse or of rescuing her daughter. The mother
may also be too afraid to do what is necessary to protect the child
once she becomes aware of the abuse.42
In some instances fathers will threaten severe bodily harm, and
further physically abuse their daughters and other family members
in order to maintain secrecy.43 However, an incestuously abusive
36. Salten, supra note 29, at 192-96.
37. Id. at 195-96.
38. DE YOUNG, supra note 9, at 39.
39. Salten, supra note 29, at 196-97.
40. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 88.
41. See Salten, supra note 29, at 196-99.
42. See id. at 195; Coleman, supra note 6, at 270-71. See also Incest Takes Time to Over-
come, in The Ann Landers Column, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, Aug. 15, 1990, at B4, col. 4,
in which a woman relates the secretive experiences of her childhood incest.
43. Margaret J. Allen, Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 609, 611-16 (1983).
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father is careful not to beat his daughter to the extent that medical
attention is necessary, or to the extent that outside attention is
focused on his daughter's injuries or his abuse."" The father's goal
is always to control his daughter and to maintain her secrecy, co-
operation and compliance.45 The daughter's injuries, therefore, go
unnoticed by teachers, other family members, medical personnel
and other adults around her who may be in a position to halt the
assaults.
Insistence that the daughter's seductivexiess precipitated the in-
cestuous activity46 induces the daughter to view herself as the
cause of the incestuous abuse as well as its victim. This intensifies
her feelings of guilt and shame. If the daughter views herself as the
cause of her pain and suffering, her shame and guilt for her own
self-destruction cause her to actually block her conscious thinking
about the acts of assault.4 She is then unable later in life to relate
her injuries to acts which she has forced herself not to remember.
Most incest begins when the victim is eight or nine years old,
although sexual contact and even intercourse at an earlier age is
not uncommon.48 Since the incestuous assaults usually continue
into adolescence, the daughter is subjected to many years of en-
forced silence. Therefore, the necessity that the incest must never
be disclosed becomes firmly and indelibly imprinted on the daugh-
ter's mind.49
The judiciary must understand that failure to report the abuse
does not indicate that the abuse has not occurred. Nor does it indi-
cate consent to or approval of the assaults, or that the daughter
does not suffer severe physical, psychological, and emotional inju-
ries. Her silence evidences only the father's domination and power
over her and her total inability to act affirmatively to halt the as-
saults. The years of silence make the daughter internalize her inju-
ries and develop the belief that she is both at fault and the vic-
44. Id. at 611-12.
45. Cf. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 74.
46. According to Dr. Judith Herman, a noted expert in the treatment of incest injuries,
the seductive daughter theory is prevalent not only in popular men's magazines but is also
still found in some professional clinical literature on the subject of incest. Dr. Herman as-
serts that minor children are wholly incapable of consenting to any sexual exploitation and
that the incestuous father seeks to place the blame on his minor daughter to relieve his own
guilt and shame. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 36-42.
47. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
48. Salten, supra note 29, at 194-95.
49. DE YOUNG, supra note 9, at 37-41.
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tim.50 She thus enters adulthood with her secret hidden not only
from everyone around her, but from herself as well.
B. Repression
A victim of incest will develop various coping mechanisms to
survive the pain of the abuse because she is unable to break the
silence and seek help for her injuries. "Coping mechanisms such as
repression, blocking, compartmentalization, denial, or even person-
ality splitting allow the child to believe he or she is not a victim."5
These coping mechanisms, developed as a means of self-preserva-
tion, add to the element of secrecy further preventing the adult
survivor from recalling the facts of the abuse.2 If the victim
blocks, denies, or otherwise represses the fact of the incestuous as-
saults, she is not able to relate the childhood assaults to her adult
injuries.
The incestuous relationship and resulting injuries may become
so deeply repressed and buried within the victim's subconscious
mind that she is actually unable to remember the abuse. It is not
until her memory is triggered by a traumatic event, or through in-
tensive professional therapy, that she is able to relate the cause of
her adult physical, psychological, and physiological injuries back to
the incestuous abuse suffered as a child." Until she does make this
connection she is wholly unable to associate the cause of her adult
injuries to the childhood incestuous abuse.5
C. Delayed Realization of the Extent of Injury
The unique nature and extent of incest injuries requires their
separate recognition from injuries sustained by victims of more
traditional torts. The incest victim may not realize the fact, extent,
and cause of incest-related injuries until years after the assaults
have ceased.
Sexual dysfunctioning is one of the greatest areas in which the
50. See Salten, supra note 29, at 198.
51. KARP & KARP, supra note 10, at 176 (1989).
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id.; see also BUTLER, supra note 32, at 48.
55. See Naomi Berkowitz, Note, Balancing the Statute of Limitations and the Discovery
Rule: Some Victims of Incestuous Abuse Are Denied Access to Washington Courts - Ty-
son v. Tyson, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 721, 723 (1987).
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extent of long-term injuries remains unknown for many years."'
The survivor of incest may not realize or comprehend that she has
latent sexual injuries until she has matured and attempts to de-
velop an adult, intimate relationship. 7 A girl in her teens cannot
reasonably be expected to have mature sexual judgment nor the
healthy intimacy normally experienced in long-term adult relation-
ships. Thus, the inability to act as a normal, mature woman may
not be perceived as a harmful injury until she is well beyond the
statute of limitations period. 8 Professional therapy becomes a nec-
essary prerequisite for the survivor of incest to become a fully
functioning, healthy adult woman. However, specialized therapy59
may be beyond the survivor's financial capabilities without recov-
ery of damages in a civil action against the one responsible for her
injuries.
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND THE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
A. Definition and Policy
Statutes of limitation are legislatively prescribed time limita-
tions on the right to litigate certain described causes of action.
Typically, the statutes declare that no suit shall be maintained on
such action unless the suit is brought within a specified period of
time after the right accrues? ° These statutes encourage plaintiffs
to bring actions in a timely manner. However, the statutes are usu-
ally tolled for persons whose lack of capacity, due to either infancy,
insanity, or imprisonment, requires them to bring proceedings
through others."
Legislatures and courts have stated different policy reasons for
encouraging timely suits, but three main policy concerns prevail.62
56. DE YOUNG, supra note 9, at 60-64.
57. See Salten, supra note 29, at 202.
58. Id.
59. See generally Courtois and Sprei, supra note 16, at 282-84 (therapists must be aware
of the extremes of theoretical orientation from: 1) the most extreme that holds incest is not
real but only the child's Oedipal wishes; 2) to those theories that hold that incest occurs
only rarely and then as a result of the daughter's seductiveness and sexual desires; 3) to
those theories that accept the reality of incest and consider family therapy the treatment of
choice).
60. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 477 (abr. 5th ed. 1983).
61. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. f (1977).
62. Handler, supra note 15, at 720-21; see also Denise M. DeRose, Comment, Adult In-
cest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-
Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 191, 216-20 (1985).
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First is the recognition that the plaintiff's harm is readily appar-
ent, and should be readily pursued and compensated. 3 Traditional
tort claims, such as injuries from automobile collisions and slip and
fall accidents, can ordinarily be brought within the statute of limi-
tations and the plaintiff is not denied the right to pursue compen-
sation for her injuries. This is true for three reasons: (1) The
wrongful act is readily apparent and recognizable; (2) the plaintiff
is aware of the nature and extent of her injuries; and (3) the plain-
tiff is aware of her need to seek judicial relief to compensate her
for her injuries.64 However, this policy concern fails to consider the
delayed claims of plaintiffs who are unable to recognize the fact
and cause of their injuries within the statute of limitations period.
The second main policy concern rests on the belief that after a
period of time a defendant's right to be let alone and free of stale
claims exceeds the plaintiff's right to prosecute a right of recov-
ery.6 5 This policy concern should not apply to an action brought by
an adult survivor of incest. Traditional tort theories consider a de-
fendant's negligent, and sometimes intentional, conduct in permit-
ting a defendant a maximum period of time to be subject to prose-
cution. In a civil incest action, however, the defendant's conduct
has been so egregious and so atrocious that the defendant should
not be entitled to be let alone merely because an arbitrary time
frame has passed before the victim becomes fully aware of the fact
and cause of her injuries.
A third policy reason to prohibit stale claims is that they reduce
judicial efficiency when evidence becomes less reliable and less
available.6 Statutes of limitation are "designed to promote justice
by preventing. . . claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded and witnesses have
disappeared. ' 67 But this last policy concern, while certainly a valid
one, should not operate to defeat actions by survivors of incest.
Evidence may also be unreliable or unavailable to support personal
injury claims brought within limitation periods. The pursuit of a
claim within a statutorily prescribed time frame does not guaran-
tee judicial efficiency. Further, survivors of incest have not delayed
claims because they have "allowed their claims to slumber." The
63. Handler, supra note 15, at 721.
64. KARP & KARP, supra note 10, at 185.
65. Handler, supra note 15, at 720.
66. Id. at 720-21.
67. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
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judiciary should act to recognize the difference between the volun-
tarily dilatory plaintiff and the incest survivor who is incapable of
realizing the fact and cause of her injuries at an earlier date.
Statutes of limitation usually begin to run from the date the ac-
tion accrues; therefore, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to
interpret the date of accrual.e8 Courts generally hold that an action
accrues when the plaintiff has the right to gain access to the
courts."" If the date of accrual is interpreted literally, the statute of
limitations begins to run at the time the wrongful act is committed
or omitted.7 0 However, in an action for incestuous abuse courts
should look to the unique nature and extent of the plaintiff's inju-
ries and find that the action accrued when the plaintiff discovered,
or reasonably should have discovered the fact and cause of her
injuries.
B. The Discovery Doctrine
The harshness and inflexibility of statutes of limitation have led
both legislatures and courts to adopt the discovery doctrine for
certain actions that would otherwise be barred by the statutory
limitation periods.7 The discovery doctrine provides that "the
statute of limitations does not begin to run at the time of injury,
but may be tolled until such time as the plaintiff knows, or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of her
injury and its cause. ' '7 2 Courts have applied the discovery doctrine
to professional malpractice actions, 73 products liability suits,7 14 ex-
68. See Handler, supra note 15, at 719.
69. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 454 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Ala. 1984) (a negli-
gence cause of action accrues as soon as the plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action),
overruled on other grounds, Hickox v. Stover, 551 So. 2d 259, 264 (Ala. 1989).
70. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, cmt. e.
71. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 166-67
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
72. DeRose, supra note 62, at 197; see also RESTATE ENT, supra note 61, cmt. e (judicial
decisions hold that the statute of limitations starts to run when plaintiff has in fact discov-
ered that she has suffered injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered it).
73. See, e.g., Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying the discov-
ery rule to medical malpractice injuries).
74. See, e.g., Harper v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (applying the
discovery rule to products liability actions for personal injuries resulting from in utero expo-
sure to the drug DES); North Coast Air Servs. v. Grumman Corp., 759 P.2d 405 (Wash.
1988) (en banc) (holding that the statute of limitations in a products liability action arising
out of an airplane crash begins to run when the claimant discovered, or in exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, the factual causal relationship between the alleged defect
in the product and the harm).
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posure to toxic substances,75 fraudulent concealment,76 and other
traditional tort actions.7
The Supreme Court recognizes the importance of the discovery
doctrine as early as 194978 In Urie v. Thompson,"' the Court ap-
plied the discovery doctrine and permitted the plaintiff to pursue
his claim, under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), for
injuries sustained as a result of on-the-job exposure to silica dust.
Mr. Urie was first exposed to the silica dust in 1910, and in 1940
he was forced to cease work when his pulmonary disease was diag-
nosed as silicosis.80 Although a rigid application of the three-year
statute of limitations of the FELA would have precluded Mr. Urie
from maintaining a suit filed after 1913, the Court ruled that Mr.
Urie's 1941 action was not barred by the FELA's limitations pe-
riod." The Court stated "[w]e do not think the humane legislative
plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless igno-
rance." 82 Under the discovery doctrine the Court held that "no
specific date of contact. . . can be charged with being the date of
injury. . . [consequently, the plaintiff] can be held to be 'injured'
only when the accumulated effects . . . manifest them-
selves. . . ."I' The Court reasoned further that a plaintiff should
not be charged with having waived his right to pursue a claim
within the applicable time period when the disease "had not yet
obtruded on his consciousness. ' 84 Finally, the Court found that the
"traditional purposes of statutes of limitations ... require the as-
sertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of
the invasion of legal rights."85 As Urie illustrates, inherent in the
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (ruling
that unique circumstances of a case may determine when an action accrues and applying the
discovery rule to asbestos exposure injuries).
76. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (applying a
statutory discovery rule when an allegation of fraudulent concealment existed in an action
by an adult survivor of childhood incest against her physician father because he had con-
cealed from her, intentionally and fraudulently, the true nature of her injuries).
77. PROSSER & KaxTON, supra note 71, at 166-67.
78. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1969).
79. Id. at 163.
80. Id. at 165-66.
81. Id. at 171.
82. Id. at 170.
83. Id. (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 12 P.2d 1075,
1076 (Cal. 1932) (emphasis added)).
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
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concept of the discovery doctrine is the recognition that the
"blamelessly ignorant" plaintiff should not be barred from recov-
ery, when such a bar would only serve to thwart the intent in pro-
viding recovery for the injury.
The judiciary should not bar an adult plaintiff from pursuing a
claim for personal injuries resulting from incest when the plaintiff
did not have knowledge of the fact and cause of her injuries, and
thus did not have notice of the invasion of her legal right to be free
from incestuous assaults. Like Mr. Urie, an adult woman who suf-
fers from injuries resulting from incestuous assaults, inflicted over
a long period of her childhood, should not be restricted to any one
date of injury. Only after the accumulated effects of incestuous as-
saults manifest themselves, usually in her adulthood, does the in-
jury occur. The defendant's "right to be free of stale claims"86 does
not outweigh the unique nature of an incest survivor's injuries
which may not be evident until after the statutory time frame has
passed.
C. Statutes of Repose
In response to pressure from defendants affected by the discov-
ery doctrine, some legislatures have enacted statutes of repose.8 7
Such statutes place an outer limit on the commencement of tort
actions regardless of any tolling provisions or the discovery doc-
trine.8 Since statutory periods of repose place an outer limit on an
action, they are longer than limitation periods and act as an abso-
lute bar to an action. However, a statute of repose may still run
before a cause of action is fully discovered because a statute of
repose, like a limitation period, usually begins to run at the date
when all elements of the cause of action have accrued.89 Thus if a
state has a statute of repose that could act to bar an incest survi-
vor's action after a specified time period, the application of the dis-
86. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
87. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 71, at 167-68.
88. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-8(a) (1975) (no disability can extend the limitations
period beyond 20 years from the date of accrual).
89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, cmt. g. Some statutes of repose may further limit plain-
tiffs in various tort actions by running from a date before the plaintiff sustains injury. See,
e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Symposium Products Liability: The Variety, Policy and Consti-
tutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. REv. 579, 585 n.28 (1981)
(statutes of repose for product liability actions may begin to run when the product is sold).
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covery doctrine may still not permit the plaintiff to pursue her
claims.9 0
D. Minority Tolling Provisions
In enacting statutes of limitation a state may provide that the
statutory time frame is tolled during the injured person's minor-
ity.91 Such a tolling provision recognizes a minor's incapacity to act
in her own behalf to seek civil redress for personal injuries, and
thus permits an adult to bring an action for personal injuries sus-
tained as a child. When a statute of limitation is tolled for minor-
ity, the time period for bringing civil suit does not begin to run
until the child reaches her age of legal majority.92 Limitation peri-
ods and age of majority statutes vary from state to state. Limita-
tions periods are usually one to three years in duration, while age
of majority statutes range from age seventeen to twenty-one.93
However, a tolling provision for minority may not be sufficient to
afford the incest survivor relief. In a healthy father-daughter rela-
tionship the daughter will separate emotionally and physically
from her father's control by the legal age of majority. But incestu-
ous families evidence a much higher degree of patriarchal control.94
The child who has been a victim of incest may not develop at the
same emotional pace as other women her age. She may, therefore,
be wholly unprepared at her legal age of majority to break the
family's conspiracy of silence and challenge her father's control in
a court of law. The short limitation periods, even when tolled for
90. The full ramifications and constitutionality of statutes of repose are beyond the scope
of this article. For a more complete discussion, see generally McGovern, supra note 89;
Francis E. McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in
Product Liability Actions: Present and Future 16 FORUM 416 (1981).
91. KARP & KARP, supra note 10, app. G (all states except Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
and Louisiana provide for tolling during minority).
92. Thus, if a state recognizes the age of majority as 18 and has a general two-year statute
of limitations for personal injuries, an injured plaintiff may bring suit on her own behalf up
to the age of 20 for injuries sustained anytime during her minority. However, for various
public policy reasons some specific causes of action are not subject to unlimited tolling pro-
visions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482(a),(b) (1975) (§ 6-5-482(a) recognizes that the discov-
ery rule may apply to medical malpractice claims such that while claims must be brought
within two years after the act or omission giving rise to the claim, the action may be brought
within six months of the date of discovery of the action; but § 6-5-482(b) states that "not-
withstanding ... no action shall be commenced more than four years after the act...
except, that in the case of a minor under four years of age, such minor shall have until his
eighth birthday to commence such action.").
93. KARP & KARP, supra note 10, app. G.
94. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
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minority, fail to recognize that the victim may still be under the
influence of her father and attempting to escape his domination. 5
The short limitation periods, even when tolled for minority, also
fail to recognize and address the unique sexual nature of the incest
survivor's injuries"6 and the effects of Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der ("PTSD").97 Even when limitation periods are tolled for mi-
nority, a young woman of only twenty or twenty-one years old who
is a survivor of incest will usually not have developed a mature
adult sexual relationship in which she has confronted problems of
frigidity, fear of trusting men or fear of intimacy.98 She may be
incapable of discovering the fact and cause of her injuries within
the limitations period after reaching her majority. Further, if she
has developed PTSD she may be unable to remember the abuse or
confront the traumatic situation that will enable her to recall the
abuse and connect the childhood assaults to the cause of her adult
injuries. 99
The result in the majority of cases is that survivors of incest are
unable to recover under traditional tort theories even with the toll-
ing provisions for minority. However, some courts have been ap-
plying the discovery doctrine to incest abuse cases to hold that the
limitations period does not run until the plaintiff is aware of the
fact and cause of her injuries, regardless of her age of majority.100
Before discussing the judicial response to incest injuries, the au-
thors wish to point out that nearly every state penalizes incest as a
criminal act.101 State legislatures have recognized the egregious na-
ture of incest and impose criminal sanctions for the infliction of
sexual assaults on minor family members. When legislatures have
failed to allow the discovery doctrine to apply to civil claims for
incest injuries, the judiciary should impute the nature of the de-
fendant's criminal conduct to civil actions and allow survivors of
incest to pursue their civil claims beyond limitation periods en-
acted for far less egregious tort actions. The father's criminal con-
duct, when considered with the unique nature of incest injuries,
95. Beckowitz, supra note 55, at 733.
96. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
98. See DE YOUNG, supra note 9, at 60-62.
99. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
100. See discussion infra part IV.
101. Every state except New Jersey has criminal incest statutes, but New Jersey has one
of the strictest criminal sexual offense statutes. See, Coleman, supra note 6, at 255 n.28.
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supports application of the discovery doctrine to civil claims for
damages.
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO INCEST INJURIES
In addressing traditional tort actions brought by adult survivors
of incest, some courts consider application of the discovery doc-
trine in two main categories of cases. Type two cases are those in
which "the [pilaintiff claims [that] due to the trauma of the expe-
rience she had no recollection or knowledge of the sexual abuse
until shortly before she filed suit.' 10 2 Type one cases are those in
which "the [p]laintiff claimed she knew about the sexual assaults
at or before [the age of] majority, but that she was unaware that
other physical and psychological problems were caused by the
prior sexual abuse.' 10 3 Courts differentiate between the plaintiff
who alleges she had knowledge of and remembered the childhood
assaults within the statute of limitations, but failed to make the
causal connection to her adult physical and emotional injuries
(type one), and the plaintiff who alleges she had repressed all
memory of the sexual abuse and had no recollection of the child-
hood assaults during the statutory time period (type two). The
type two plaintiffs are, therefore, more often permitted to utilize
the discovery doctrine and pursue their claims beyond mandated
time frames because they were incapable of pursuing their claims
at an earlier time.
A. Type Two Cases: Repressed Memory
Type two cases are those in which the trauma of the incest actu-
ally caused the victim to repress her memory of the facts of the
assaults, thus burying all remembrance of the assaults in her sub-
conscious mind.10 The child's coping mechanisms allow and force
her to forget the assaults occurred, then later prevent the survivor
from causally connecting her adult injuries to the unremembered
assaults within the statute of limitations. In such instances courts
have permitted application of the discovery doctrine so that the
limitation period commences to run when the incest survivor dis-
covers, or reasonably should have discovered, that she was injured
102. Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988), summary judgment
granted, 766 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
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and that her injuries were caused by the wrongful act of another.105
A landmark repressed memory case is Johnson v. Johnson,0 6
containing the enlightened opinion of Judge Plunkett. In Johnson
the federal district court, sitting in diversity, held that under the
law of Illinois the discovery doctrine would apply to a plaintiff who
had suppressed all memory of childhood incest and was therefore
unable to bring suit within the limitations period. Judge Plunkett's
opinion, recognizing the distinctions in the two types of cases, rep-
resents an understanding of the unique nature of the injuries suf-
fered by adult survivors of incest.10 7 The court noted that incest is
a crime and "a major social problem" 08 and that application of the
discovery doctrine would entail "a case-by-case method which
seems to take into account equitable considerations as strongly, if
not more strongly, than it takes into account problems of proof."' 09
Deborah Johnson was thirty-three years old when she filed suit
against her parents alleging intentional and negligent causes of ac-
tion for personal injuries stemming from her father's repeated sex-
ual assaults inflicted when she was ages three to thirteen, and her
mother's knowledge of and failure to halt the assaults. 1 0 Ms. John-
son was seeking compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful
acts that occurred over twenty years prior to the time she filed
suit."' Ms. Johnson alleged in her amended complaint that she
"suppressed all memories of the alleged sexual abuse and was
blamelessly ignorant of the causal connection between
[d]efendants' acts and the injuries she suffered until . . . when in
the course of psychotherapy, [she] was able to begin to remember,
perceive and understand the nature and scope of her injuries and
105. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1370.
106. 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
107. Id. at 1367.
108. Id. at 1370.
109. Id. at 1369-70.
110. Id. at 1364-65.
111. In 1988, when the United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois
first heard Johnson v. Johnson, the Illinois statute of limitations provided that "[a]ctions
for damages for an injury to the person ... or for seduction ... shall be commenced within
2 years next after the cause of action accrued. . . ." ILL. RE V. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-202
(1987). A literal reading of the Illinois statute, even providing for the tolling provision for
minors, would have barred Deborah Johnson's claims. At that time, however, Illinois had
already applied the discovery doctrine to personal injury claims in the following situations:
exposure to asbestos, fraud and tortious misconduct in a leaky roof claim, a wrongful death
action in a medical malpractice claim, products liability and legal malpractice. See Johnson,
701 F. Supp. at 1369.
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their causal connection to [d]efendants' earlier acts.""'
Ms. Johnson's parents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the
Illinois two-year statute of limitations was an absolute bar to their
daughter's action. 113 The court treated the motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b), because matters outside the pleading were con-
sidered by the court, including the affidavit of Ms. Johnson's psy-
chotherapist. 114 The affidavit stated that Ms. Johnson was suffer-
ing from multiple personality disorder and that because of this
"psychiatric disturbance . ..was unable to remember the sexual
abuse by her father until . . . when in the course of therapy...
she was able to trust another individual enough to allow sup-
pressed memories and personalities or personality fragments to
surface.""' 5
The court applied the discovery doctrine to Ms. Johnson's action
and ruled that "[t]he point at which the statute of limitations com-
mences under the discovery rule is a question of fact." 1 6 In recog-
nizing the issue as a question of fact the court stated: "At some
point the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient informa-
tion concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person
on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved. At
that point, under the discovery rule, the running of the limitations
period commences.'117 Under this reasoning, the court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss."'
Nearly three years later, on a new motion for summary judgment
by Ms. Johnson's parents, the same federal district court reconsid-
ered the matter." 9 On January 1, 1991, the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure had been amended by adding section 313-202.2 address-
ing childhood sexual abuse. In pertinent part, that section
provides:
An action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual
abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the date the person
abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should
112. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1364.
113. Id. at 1364.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1366 (quoting affidavit of Elizabeth E. Raymer, M.A., M.F.C.C.).
116. Id. at 1370.
117. Id. (quoting Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 430 N.E.2d 976, 980-81 (IM. 1981)).
118. Id. at 1370.
119. Johnson v. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. IM. 1991).
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discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that
the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse, but in no event
may an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse
be commenced more than 12 years after the date on which the per-
son abused attains the age of 18 years.120
Ms. Johnson's parents argued that under the new provision their
daughter's complaint would be time-barred and should be
dismissed. 2 '
The court explained that at the time of its previous holding, Illi-
nois had not addressed a situation where an adult incest victim
had no conscious memory of the abuse until after the statutory
tolling provision had expired. Since this was a case of first impres-
sion, the court had considered case law approaches from other ju-
risdictions in reaching its decision. 122 However, in the face of Illi-
nois' new statutory discovery rule which is coupled with a statute
of repose, 12 3 the court determined that Ms. Johnson's complaint
was time-barred. The court found dispositive the fact that she did
not file the action until she was thirty-six years of age. 24 Under
the new provision, she was barred from filing a timely complaint
after her thirtieth birthday. The court granted the parents' motion
for summary judgment but left undisturbed its reasoning in the
previous decision.
125
In regard to claims for incestuous abuse filed beyond the limita-
tions periods, the judge in the initial Johnson case should be ap-
plauded for considering the factual issues of when the plaintiff be-
came aware of her abuse, its causal connection to her adult
injuries, her awareness that the injuries were caused by the wrong-
ful acts of another, and whether she acted promptly to pursue her
claims once she became aware of the fact and cause of her injuries.
The discovery doctrine has also been applied by the Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin in Hammer v. Hammer.12 In Hammer the
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd 1991).
121. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. at 663.
122. Id.
123. For a discussion of statutes of repose, see supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
124. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. at 664. There is confusion in the Johnson cases about Ms.
Johnson's age. The 1988 opinion indicates she was 32 years old in 1987. Johnson, 701 F.
Supp. at 1365. However, the 1991 opinion gives her birthdate at 1952. Johnson, 766 F. Supp.
at 662.
125. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. at 664-65.
126. 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 428 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 1988).
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court held "as a matter of law, that a cause of action for incestu-
ous abuse will not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and
cause of the injury."'127 The Hammer court actually combined the
two types of incest cases by holding as a matter of law that the
discovery doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations until
the plaintiff discovers both the fact that childhood abuse has oc-
curred and its causal connection to her adult injuries.
Plaintiff Laura Hammer was twenty-one years old when she filed
her action alleging incestuous abuse, and intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress resulting from injuries inflicted on
her by her father when she was between the ages of five and fif-
teen.128 Ms. Hammer's complaint alleged that the trauma of the
abuse had caused her to develop various coping mechanisms such
that she suppressed the nature and existence of her psychological
and emotional injuries. Ms. Hammer's psychological distress
caused her "great shame, embarrassment, guilt, self-blame, denial,
depression, and disassociation from her experiences.' 12 Ms. Ham-
mer believed that she was responsible for the abuse, for her par-
ents' divorce, and for the family's subsequent breakup. 130 She "was
unable to perceive or know the existence or nature of her psycho-
logical and emotional injuries" until she was twenty-one, and only
then because she suffered "shock and distress" when her father at-
tempted to gain legal custody of her minor sister.1 1
The court found, based upon an affidavit submitted by Ms.
Hammer's psychological counselor, that "Laura's psychological
manifestations were the usually recognized symptoms of post-trau-
matic stress disorder [present] in victims of intrafamilial sexual
abuse" and that "as a normal post-traumatic stress reaction, Laura
had developed denial and suppression coping mechanisms.' 1 32 Be-
cause these coping mechanisms had prevented Ms. Hammer from
pursuing her claims within the statutory time frame,'33 the discov-
127. 418 N.W.2d at 26 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 24.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 24-25.
131. Id. at 25.
132. Id.
133. Wisconsin had a two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts and a three-year
statute of limitations for negligent torts. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 893.57, 893.54(1) (West 1983).
Even though these statutes were tolled during Ms. Hammer's minority, the limitations peri-
ods had still expired by the time she filed her complaint. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 24 n.4.
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ery doctrine was applied as a matter of law.
It is important to note that the court in Hammer expressly rec-
ognized the unique nature of the tort of incestuous abuse. The
court balanced the rights of the parties involved and recognized
that in incestuous abuse cases "the injustice of barring meritorious
claims before the claimant knows of the injury outweighs the
threat of stale or -fraudulent actions"'34 because to "protect the
parent at the expense of the child works an intolerable perversion
of justice."'13 5
The result of the reasoning in Johnson and Hammer is that a
plaintiff's realization of when she discovered the fact and cause of
injuries is a factual issue. However, whether the discovery doctrine
is to be applied is a legal issue that must first be determined by
the court. Thus, the judiciary must apply the discovery doctrine
and permit a plaintiff to offer proof to the finder of fact about: (1)
When she became aware of her childhood assaults; (2) when she
became aware that these childhood assaults are the cause of her
adult injuries; and (3) whether she acted in a timely fashion from
the date of discovery to pursue her cause for civil damages.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has also applied the dis-
covery rule to a type two case in which the plaintiff did not under-
stand or discover her cause of action during the applicable statute
of limitations. In Osland v. Osland136 plaintiff Rebecca Osland filed
an action against her father for assault and battery when she was
twenty-two years old based on sexual assaults inflicted between the
ages of ten and fifteen.137 The trial court applied the discovery doc-
trine to Ms. Osland's claims and refused to dismiss her action as
beyond the statute of limitations. 138 On appeal the court agreed
with the trial court that plaintiff had "suffered 'severe emotional
trauma' from the sexual abuse and that she 'was not able to fully
understand or discover her cause of action during the applicable
statutory time period .... , ,,13' The trial court's determination
that Ms. Osland's emotional trauma "resulted in her being unable
134. Id. at 27 (quoting Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 335 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Wis. 1983)).
135. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Margaret J. Allen, Comment, Tort Remedies
for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 609, 631 (1983)).
136. 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989).
137. Id. at 908.
138. Id. at 908-09.
139. Id. at 908. In this cross-appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the trial
court's application of the discovery doctrine to Ms. Osland's claims, but also upheld the trial
court's denial of punitive damages. The court further ruled that "the amount of damages is
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to fully understand or discover her cause of action" was a factual
question that the Supreme Court of North Dakota found was not
clearly erroneous.14 Ms. Osland's inability to pursue her claims
within the mandated time frames warranted application of the dis-
covery doctrine to toll the two-year statute of limitations for as-
sault and battery. 1"
It is especially noteworthy that the Supreme Court of North Da-
kota specifically refused to apply the rationale of Tyson v. Ty-
son,142 and instead agreed with Justice Pearson's dissent in Tyson
"that concern about the availability of objective evidence should
not preclude application of the discovery rule.' 43 Explicitly re-
jecting the majority opinion in Tyson, the Osland court agreed
with the trial court's finding that incest victims suffer severe emo-
tional trauma that can result in an inability to understand or dis-
cover-their cause of action during the limitation period. 44 This is-
sue was recently addressed by the Supreme Court of Nevada in
Petersen v. Bruen145 in which the court decided to toll the limita-
tions period without benefit of the discovery doctrine. The court
held that no existing statute of limitations applies to bar an adult
survivor of childhood sexual abuse when the plaintiff can show by
clear and convincing evidence that she has been sexually abused
during minority.146
a finding of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." Id. at
910.
140. 442 N.W.2d at 909.
141. Id. North Dakota had a two-year statute of limitations for actions for assault and
battery, N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(1) (1974), and a one-year minority tolling provision
that recognized age 18 as the age of majority, Id. § 28-01-25(1). Ms. Osland's claims were,
therefore, still filed three years beyond the applicable time periods.
142. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) superseded by statute as stated in North Coast Air. Serv.
Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 759 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1988); see infra text accompanying notes 164-
77.
143. Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 909 (citing Tyson, 727 P.2d at 213 (Pearson, J., dissenting)).
144. Id. at 907.
145. 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990). The plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused as a child
from 1975 to 1983 while he was a member of the Big Brothers program. He repressed memo-
ries of the abuse until he commenced psychotherapy in 1987. Id. at 19. The Supreme Court
of Nevada was not willing to apply the discovery rule, reasoning that in those cases where
clear and convincing proof of childhood sexual abuse exists, adoption of the rule "would
produce some untoward, if not bizarre, possibilities." Id. at 23. However, the court looked at
the public policy concerns surrounding the statute of limitations and found that the fact
that a claim was based on allegations of childhood sexual abuse did not eliminate or dimin-
ish concerns about fraudulent or oppressive claims. Id. at 23.
146. Id. at 24-25.
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California courts have both accepted 47 and rejected'48 applica-
tion of the discovery doctrine to sexual abuse cases. In a type two/
repressed memory case, Mary D. v. John D.,' 49 the Sixth District
Court of Appeals held:
[T]he period of limitations is tolled when the child victim of alleged
sexual abuse psychologically represses all memory of the acts of
abuse while she is still a minor and does not remember those acts
until a date after attaining majority, which date will constitute the
time of accrual of the cause of action.150
Mary Doe was twenty-four years old when she filed an action
against her father for sexual assaults inflicted upon her when she
was younger than five years old. Thus, her action was filed
nineteen years after the assaults occurred. Ms. Doe alleged that the
acts of abuse "were accomplished by dominance and duress on [her
father's] part . . . that [her father] committed the acts in secret
and accompanied [these acts with] implicit and explicit directions
never to tell others," and that these factors, when "coupled with
the relationship of dependency and trust. . . caused [Ms. Doe] to
develop various psychological mechanisms including but not lim-
ited to denial, repression, and disassociation from the exper-
iences.' 15 The psychological mechanisms precluded her "from be-
coming aware of her injuries and their probable causal connection
to [her father's] acts' 5 2 within the limitations period. 53 The court
concluded:
[T]he doctrine of delayed discovery may be applied in a case where
plaintiff can establish lack of memory of tortious acts due to psycho-
logical repression which took place before plaintiff attained the age
147. See Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review dismissed,
800 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1990).
148. DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); see discussion infra
notes 184-99 and accompanying text.
149. 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review dismissed, 800 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1990).
150. Id. at 634.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. This case was decided under California's former statute of limitations for actions
arising out of incestuous abuse, which stated that "the time for commencement of the action
shall be three years." CAL. CxV. PRoc. COD § 340.1(a) (West 1986). However, subsection (d)
mandated that "[n]othing in this bill is intended to preclude the courts from applying
delayed discovery exceptions to the accrual of a cause of action for sexual molestation of a
minor." Id. § 340.1(d).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:1
of majority, and which caused plaintiff to forget the facts of the acts
of abuse until a date subsequent to which the complaint is timely
filed. 154
At least two other cases have recognized the validity of applying
the discovery doctrine to type two instances of repressed memory.
Meiers-Post v. Schafer15 was an action brought by a thirty-year-
old woman for injuries resulting from sexual abuse inflicted by her
high school teacher while the plaintiff was a student. The Court of
Appeals of Michigan held that "the period of limitation is tolled
where the child victim of an illicit sexual relationship psychologi-
cally represses the memory of the events ... . The court went
on to conclude that the "statute of limitations can be tolled under
the insanity [tolling provisions] if . . . plaintiff can make out a
case that she has repressed the memory of the facts upon which
her claim is predicated, such that she could not have been aware of
rights she was otherwise bound to know ... .
154. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 639. Because of the procedural posture of this case, i.e., considera-
tion of the trial court's order granting the father summary judgment on his statute of limita-
tions defense, the court noted that "opinions as to the existence or cause of specific psycho-
logical processes such as repression or disassociation would require competent expert
opinion testimony" to be presented to the trial court. Id. at 640.
155. 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. 1988); see also Nicolette v. Carey, 751 F. Supp. 695 (W.D.
Mich. 1990); Callahan v. Iowa, 464 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 1990).
In Nicolette, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan relied
on Meiers-Post and allowed an adult to bring a tort action against her father for alleged
incidents of sexual abuse during her childhood. Nicolette, 751 F. Supp. at 698.
Also relying on Meiers-Post, the Supreme Court of Iowa allowed the mother of a deaf and
cerebral palsied child to bring action against Iowa under the state tort claims act for abuse
of her child while he was a student at a state-operated school. Callahan, 464 N.W.2d at 272.
The court found that the child suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and that
Iowa's statutory discovery rule would apply to the statute of limitations governing the state
tort claims act. Id. at 271-72.
156. Meiers-Post, 427 N.W.2d at 607. The court imposed an additional requirement that
there be corroboration that the alleged sexual abuse actually occurred. In this instance the
former high school teacher admitted to the illicit sexual relationship and relied solely on the
statute of limitations defense. Therefore, the court held that it would "not decide whether a
less restrictive rule is justified since the facts presently before [the court] do not necessitate
an examination of that issue." Id.
157. Id. at 610. In finding that a plaintiff who had repressed memories of childhood sex-
ual abuse or who was otherwise so traumatized by the experience so as to impair his or her
ability to bring legal action could avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, the courts of
both Michigan and New Jersey have stressed that the alleged incapacity or repression would
bring the plaintiff within the insanity tolling provisions of the statutes of limitation. See,
e.g., id.; Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 321, cert. denied, 585 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1990).
In Jones, the plaintiff sued her parents under a tort cause of action, alleging that her
father sexually abused her as a child with her mother's approval. She also alleged her father
threatened her with violence if she exposed him. Jones, 576 A.2d at 317-18. The court found
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Although not an incestuous abuse case, in Simmons v. United
States5" the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the United States Western District of Washington and
permitted recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act in a case in
which the plaintiff alleged repressed memory of sexual abuse. l59
Jerrie Simmons filed suit against the federal government for in-
juries resulting from a sexual affair she had with her Indian Health
Service counselor, a federal government employee. The court ap-
plied the discovery doctrine and held that for purposes of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act the two-year statute of limitations began to
run, not when the plaintiff was actually, assaulted, but when she
first discovered through psychiatric analysis that her trust in, and
sexual relationship with her counselor caused emotional injury.160
The court analogized the actions of the counselor with those of a
parent in an incestuous relationship because the trust and faith a
patient places in her counselor are much like the trust and faith a
child places in a parent.'' The court was persuaded that the im-
pact of the sexual affair had the same severe traumatic effects on
Ms. Simmons that a child experiences when incestuously assaulted
by a trusted parent."2 The discovery doctrine was applied because
the plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome which
prevented her from knowing, within the limitations period, that
her emotional and psychological injuries were the result of her
counselor's improper conduct in her case. 6 3
Not all repressed memory cases have resulted in application of
the discovery doctrine. The landmark case denying recovery to a
survivor of childhood incest is Tyson v. Tyson," 4 decided by the
that, as a victim of sexual misconduct, the plaintiff suffered mental trauma so severe as to
constitute "insanity" under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-21 (West 1987) which tolls the statute of
limitations if the plaintiff was "insane" at the accruing of the cause of action until such time
as he or she becomes sane. Jones, 576 A.2d at 317.
158. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1367.
161. Id. at 1365.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1367. The two-year statute of limitations of the Federal Tort Claims Act was
held to apply not when Jerrie Simmons first had sexual intercourse, but when she was sub-
sequently advised by her psychiatrist and learned for the first time that the counselor's
conduct caused her emotional injury. Id. at 1368.
164. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) superseded by statute as stated in North Coast Air Servs.
Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 759 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1988). The Tyson court refused to apply the
discovery rule to any civil incest case in the absence of independent verification of the alle-
gations. Other courts taking such an approach include Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578
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Supreme Court of Washington in 1986. In Tyson the twenty-six-
year-old plaintiff had repressed all memory of her father's sexual
assaults from her conscious mind until her memory was triggered
by professional therapy less than one year before she filed her civil
action. However, the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limita-
tions from maintaining a traditional tort action against her
father.165
Nancy Louise Tyson filed her original action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington for
adult injuries resulting from sexual assaults inflicted when she was
between the ages of three and eleven.'166 Ms. Tyson alleged that
severe emotional trauma caused her to repress all memory of the
assaults. She did not recall the facts of the childhood assaults.
Thus until Ms. Tyson's memory was triggered by professional ther-
apy, she did not equate the assaults to the emotional problems she
was experiencing as an adult.'67
After her father moved for summary judgment the following
question of state law was certified to the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington: "Does the discovery rule, which tolls the statute of limita-
tions until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discov-
ered a cause of action, apply to intentional torts where the victim
has blocked the incident from her conscious memory during the
entire time of the statute of limitations?"' 68 The court concluded:
[T]he substantial risks of stale claims in cases of this nature ...
[require] a literal reading of the statutes of limitation .... [Tihe
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) and St. Michelle v. Robinson, 759 P.2d 467 (Wash. App. 1988). In
Whatcott, the plaintiff alleged that his father had sexually molested him. He was aware of
the abuse when he was 18 but claimed that the mechanism of psychological repression con-
stituted either an "exceptional circumstance" or mental incompetence which tolled the run-
ning of the statutes of limitations. Whatcott, 790 P.2d. at 580-81. Because the plaintiff had
attended college, married, and was employed during the time of alleged incompetence, the
court concluded that he was competent and should have been able to file a timely action. Id.
at 581.
In St. Michelle, a daughter brought suit against her father for outrage, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and child abuse alleging that he sexually abused
her while she was a minor. The court held that the three-year general statute of limitations
was applicable to torts of outrage and infliction of emotional distress. St. Michelle, 759 P.2d
at 470. However, the court held that the plaintiff was not time barred by the three-year
statute of limitations because she filed her complaint before she turned 21. Id.
165. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 227.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 226-27.
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discovery rule does not apply to an intentional tort claim where the
plaintiff has blocked the incident from her conscious memory during
the period of the statute of limitations. 69
The court refused to apply the discovery doctrine because
"[p]sychology and psychiatry are imprecise disciplines . . . [that]
are primarily subjective and most of their findings are not based
on physically observable evidence"'170 and because of the eviden-
tiary problems inherent in pursuing claims after the statutory time
period. The court's main concern was that "the availability and
trustworthiness of objective, verifiable evidence" would not be ca-
pable of proof. 7' The obvious error in this rationale is that by de-
nying application of the discovery doctrine, the court did not per-
mit the parties to reach the evidentiary issues. Application of the
discovery doctrine would have permitted Ms. Tyson to pursue her
claims to the evidentiary stage, at which point proof of her claims
would have had to satisfy the finder of fact for actual recovery.
Whether plaintiff's ultimate proof will be objective, verifiable and
capable of proof is irrelevant to the issue of the statute of
limitations.
Justice Pearson vehemently dissented from the majority's opin-
ion in Tyson. He asserted that the majority opinion violated no-
tions of fundamental fairness in several ways: First, by confusing
proof problems with the threshold determination of whether the
discovery doctrine should permit the plaintiff to pursue an action
to the stage of proof;172 second, by discrediting" the validity of ex-
pert mental health professionals' testimony regarding a plaintiff's
memory and recollection, 7 3 and, third by failing to recognize the
enormous problems of childhood sexual abuse and how the trauma
of the sexual abuse may cause total repression from conscious
memory. 7 4 Justice Pearson stated that "it is unfair to deny adult
169. Id. at 230. Ms. Tyson's claims were considered under the general three-year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions and the tolling provisions recognizing a child's dis-
ability to act during minority. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.080(2) (West Supp. 1991).
However, even with the tolling provisions, Ms. Tyson's claims were still filed five years after
the limitations period expired. Note that these statutes were not amended between 1986
(the time of the Tyson decision) and 1991.
170. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229.
171. Id. at 228.
172. Id. at 230-32 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 232-33 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 233-37 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
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survivors of childhood sexual abuse a legal remedy."'175 He believed
the discovery doctrine should apply to cases in which plaintiffs al-
lege they did not pursue an action within the statute of limitations
due to repressed memory of the abuse,176 thus, supporting applica-
tion of the discovery doctrine to type two/repressed memory cases.
Justice Pearson concluded by stating:
The purpose behind extending the discovery rule to adult survi-
vors of childhood sexual abuse is not to provide a guaranteed rem-
edy to such plaintiffs. The purpose is to provide an opportunity for
an adult who claims to have been sexually abused as a child to prove
not only that she was abused and that the defendant was her abuser,
but that her suffering was such that she did not and could not rea-
sonably have discovered all the elementi of her cause of action at an
earlier time. The policy behind providing this opportunity has been
demonstrated: the nature of child sexual abuse, according to exten-
sive expert commentary, is often so secretive, so humiliating, and so
devastating that a victim typically represses the events until the
abuse is "discovered" - often through psychotherapy, and often
well into adulthood. 7 7
Lindabury v. Lindabury7 8 is another decision denying applica-
tion of the discovery doctrine in a type two/repressed memory
case. Nancy Lindabury was thirty-four years old when she filed her
action for sexual battery against her parents for assaults inflicted
by her father when she was between the ages of four and thir-
teen.179 Ms. Lindabury had repressed or blocked memories of the
sexual assaults until the memories were rediscovered by psycholog-
ical counseling shortly before she filed suit. The District Court of
Appeals of Florida held that, as a matter of law, the action was
clearly time barred because "the alleged incestuous acts . . . dam-
aged [Ms. Lindabury] at the time they occurred. The last contem-
poraneous injury is itself sufficient to complete the cause of action
and commence the limitations period."'' e0 Thus, the court strictly
adhered to the limitations period and refused to apply the discov-
ery doctrine even though Ms. Lindabury had been unable to recall
175. Tyson, 727 p. 2d at 235 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 230 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
177. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 237 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
178. 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), appeal dismissed, 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
1990).




the facts of the abuse within the statutory time frame.' 8 '
Justice Jorgenson dissented in Lindabury and stated that the
"delayed discovery rule may apply to actions brought by adult vic-
tims of childhood incest upon the factfinder's determination that
the claimant, suffering from post traumatic stress syndrome,
blocked or repressed conscious memory of the alleged abuse
throughout the limitations period."'" 2 Although Justice Jorgenson
did not advocate immediate application of the discovery rule to the
facts at hand, he did state:
[B]ecause incest is such an odious crime which causes deep-rooted
injuries more subtle and complex than those caused by other tor-
tious acts, [Ms. Lindabury] should have the opportunity to present
to the trial court expert testimony on the issue of post traumatic
stress syndrome and, if the court finds the expert opinion evidence
relevant and therefore admissible, allow the fact finder to determine
whether [Ms. Lindabury] could have brought the action earlier but
for repression. 183
The objective, verifiable evidence that Justice Jorgenson would
utilize for application of the discovery doctrine is not that the al-
leged acts actually occurred, or that the claimant has actually suf-
fered injury, or that the injuries were caused by the acts of the
defendant, but only that the claimant repressed her memory and
this repression should entitle her to pursue her claims beyond the
statutory time frame.
Application of the discovery doctrine to delayed claims of inces-
tuous abuse does not assure a plaintiff that she will recover dam-
ages, but it does assure the plaintiff that her claims will not be
summarily dismissed as time barred. An analysis of the special
proof and evidentiary requirements, as well as constitutional is-
sues, which confront the parties once the discovery doctrine is ap-
plied are beyond the scope of this article.
181. Id. The court applied the state's four-year statute of limitations period for assault,
battery and other intentional torts. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(o) (1987). The court refused to
concede that there might be a tolling provision for minority. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d at 1117-
18. Florida is one of the states that does not provide tolling the statute of limitations for
minority. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
182. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d at 1118 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
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B. Type One Cases: Known Abuse/Unknown Injury
Courts generally deny recovery to plaintiffs who allege they had
factual knowledge of the abuse within the statute of limitations. In
type one cases, the plaintiffs request application of the discovery
doctrine to their delayed claims because they only recently realized
all elements of their cause of action.
A typical example of the judiciary's reaction to type one cases is
the reasoning of the California Court of Appeals in DeRose v.
Carswell."" Dianne DeRose was twenty-four years old when she
sought damages for assault, battery, and infliction of emotional
distress from her step-grandfather for assaults inflicted from ages
four to eleven. Ms. DeRose did not allege that she had repressed
all memory of the sexual assaults, but instead that she had not
made the causal connection between the remembered assaults and
her adult injuries.18 5 The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. 86 The court held,
as a matter of law, that the discovery rule did not apply because
the plaintiff was actually aware of the assaults within the statute
of limitations and was therefore aware of the facts necessary to
state a cause of action."8 " Because the plaintiff was aware of the
assaults in a timely manner, even though she was not aware of the
causal connection to her adult injuries, the discovery doctrine did
not apply. 8 The court explained that "the delayed discovery doc-
trine applies only when a plaintiff has not discovered all of the
facts essential to [her] cause of action.' 89
184. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
185. Id. at 370.
186. Id. at 369. California has a one-year statute of limitations for assault, battery, and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE: § 340.3
(West 1986). California permits tolling the limitations periods during minority and requires
the plaintiff to file her action within one year of reaching the age of majority (18). See CAL.
CiV. PROC. CODE § 352(a) (West 1986). The court ruled that Ms. DeRose's claims were filed
four years and ten months too late. DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
187. DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
188. Id. at 371. The court stated in dicta that plaintiff's claims would have been barred
even under California's revised three-year statute of limitations period for sexual abuse
cases that was adopted subsequent to plaintiff filing her complaint. Id. 373; see CAL. Civ.
CODE PROC. § 340.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1991).
189. DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371; accord Doe v. Doe, 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990). But cf., Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (awareness of
assault at the time it occurred is not awareness of the wrongfulness that may be realized
after the statute of limitations).
In Doe, an adult woman filed suit against her father for alleged sexual abuse when she was
a child. The plaintiff alleged she denied and repressed memories of the abuse and that sub-
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Since the DeRose decision, California has joined an increasing
number of state legislatures that have passed a statutory discovery
rule for civil childhood sexual abuse cases.' 90 The California stat-
ute, which became effective January 1, 1991, allows victims, re-
gardless of age, to sue within three years after discovering their
injuries, or eight years after reaching majority, whichever date oc-
curs later.191
In 1991, the California Sixth District Court of Appeals which
had decided DeRose reconsidered their opinion in Daly v. Der-
rick.9 2  Three adult plaintiffs sued their former high school
teacher, the school district and school district agents in 1987, alleg-
ing that the teacher sexually molested them from 1977-78 while
they were students. 93 On an appeal from the defendants' success-
ful motion for summary judgment, the court noted that California
had recently amended the statute of limitations for childhood sex-
ual abuse and that such amendment effectively rejected their hold-
ing in DeRose. However, the court also noted that the statutory
discovery rule could not apply in the instant case as the rule ap-
plied only to actions commenced after January 1, 1991.'9
sequent therapy triggered her knowledge of the abuse. The court found that the plaintiff's
allegations were sufficient for application of the discovery rule. The deciding factor was
whether the repression occurred before the plaintiff was of the age of majority and then
continued until a recent time. Doe, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
In Evans, three brothers brought suit against their foster parents for damages allegedly
resulting from the foster parents' abusing them as children from 1966-68. The brothers filed
suit in 1987 claiming that abuse had caused them to develop blocking mechanisms including
repression and disassociation. They were consequently unable to perceive the psychological
injuries caused them or their causal connection to the foster parents' acts until they engaged
in therapy. The court held that in order to prevail the plaintiffs had to show that they
remained unaware of, and had no reason to suspect, the wrongfulness of the conduct until a
time less than three years before the action was filed. The brothers were given leave to
amend their complaint, since their claims were not sufficient to invoke the discovery rule.
Evans, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
190. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140. (1986); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Cum.
Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1991); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 614.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West
CuM. Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Cum. Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
537.046 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 26-10-25 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. XII, § 522 (CuM. Supp. 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (Cum.
Supp. 1991).
191. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 340.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
192. 281 Cal. Rptr. 709, (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
193. Id. at 707.
194. Id. at 716.
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Relying on Evans v. Eckelman,195 the court analyzed delayed
discovery of the wrongfulness of a defendant's conduct in the con-
text of childhood sexual molestation.' Observing that the nature
of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant plays a signifi-
cant part in a court's application of the delayed discovery doctrine,
the court found that a teacher, who stands in loco parentis, is in a
fiduciary relationship with his students. Since a fiduciary relation-
ship carries a duty of full disclosure and application of the discov-
ery rule "prevents the fiduciary from obtaining immunity for an
initial breach of duty by a subsequent breach of the obligation of
disclosure,"' 9 7 the discovery rule was appropriate in this case. Reit-
erating their position in DeRose, the court then observed that the
delayed discovery doctrine applies only when a plaintiff has not
discovered all of the facts essential to the cause of action.'98 How-
ever, the court went one step further than DeRose and stated that
the plaintiff's knowledge of the fact that she has been wronged is
an essential part of the cause of action. Holding that the statute of
limitations begins to run only when a plaintiff knows or should
have known of all the facts essential to the cause of action, includ-
ing the fact that she has been wronged, the court reversed the deci-
sion granting summary judgment for the defendants. 99
The Supreme Court of Montana in E.W. and D.W. v. D.C.H.200
held the discovery doctrine did not apply when the adult survivor
195. 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). For a discussion of Evans, see supra note
189.
196. Daly v. Derrick, 281 Cal. Rptr. 709, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
197. Daly, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 723. But see Marsha V. v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr. 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) for
a different approach by the California Second District Court of Appeals heard one week
before Daly. In Marsha V., an adult brought suit against her step-father for allegedly sexu-
ally molesting her in 1963 when she was eight years old until 1972 when she was seventeen
years old. Id. at 474. Since the plaintiff brought suit in 1987, California's new statutory
discovery rule did not apply. The court held that the facts of the case were indistinguishable
from DeRose and that the delayed discovery doctrine was inapplicable. Id. at 476. In a vig-
orous dissent (modified after the Daly decision), Justice Johnson urged a remand to give the
plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint in case she was in a position to allege she
repressed the wrongfulness of the abusive conduct which caused her alleged injuries. Id. at
480 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
200. 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988). See also Bowser v. Guttendorf, 541 A.2d 377 (Pa. 1988)
in which a Pennsylvania court refused to apply the discovery rule when the plaintiff had
continuous memory of the prior abuse. The plaintiff brought a tort action against her foster
parents alleging that her foster father had sexually abused her, causing her present emo-
tional problems. Id. at 378-79. The court found that the plaintiff did not allege sufficiently
why she was not able to discover her injuries; thus, her allegations were inadequate to con-
sider application of the discovery rule. Id. at 380.
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of incest was aware the childhood assaults had occurred within the
statute of limitations. 20 1 E.W. and her husband filed this action for
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, and loss of consortium when E.W. was thirty-four years
old. The action was filed against her step-uncle for sexual assaults
inflicted when she was five to twelve years old.20 2
In her complaint E.W. "acknowledged that she 'always knew' she
had been molested as a child and that she has suffered from psy-
chological problems since late adolescence. '203 The court stated
that "[f]or this reason alone, her claim must fail. 20 4 E.W. had
sought counseling for her injuries since she was a teenager, but it
was not until she received psychiatric counseling pending her sec-
ond divorce in 1983 that the childhood assaults were causally
linked to her continuing adult emotional problems.20 5 The court
refused to apply the discovery doctrine because "[tihe central pre-
cept of [the] discovery rule is that the plaintiff was unaware, and
could not reasonably have been aware, of the wrongful act which
later resulted in ...her injury until after the statute of limita-
tions had run. ' 20 6 Thus because this plaintiff always remembered
the fact she had been assaulted as a child, she was precluded from
pursuing her tort action, even though she was unaware of the
causal connection to her adult injuries. 20 7
The court's language leads to the presumption that had E.W.
alleged she had repressed all memory of the childhood assaults un-
til a point subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations,
she would have been permitted to apply the discovery doctrine to
her claims for adult injuries.
The Court of Appeals of Washington also refused to apply the
discovery doctrine in two cases in which the plaintiffs admitted
they remembered the incestuous assaults within the statute of lim-
itations but only recently made the causal connection to their
adult injuries. In Raymond v. Ingram20 8 and Kaiser v. Milliman,20 9
the plaintiffs were aware of the fact they had been incestuously
201. E.W. and D.W., 754 P.2d at 820.
202. Id. at 818.
203. Id. at 820.
.204. Id.
205. Id. at 818.
206. Id. at 820.
207. Id.
208. 737 P.2d 314 (Wash. App. 1987).
209. 747 P.2d 1130 (Wash. App. 1988).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
abused within the limitations period but sought application of the
discovery doctrine because they were unable to realize the causa-
tive element of their adult injuries, and thus were unable to pursue
an action for damages, within the limitations period.
In Raymond v. Ingram, decided in 1987, Pamela Jo Raymond
was already past the age of majority when she filed an action
against her paternal grandparents for sexual assaults by her grand-
father that began when she was four years old and continued to
the age of seventeen. The court held that because Ms. Raymond
knew she had been sexually assaulted as a child but only alleged
that professional therapy alerted her to the causal connection be-
tween the abuse and her adult injuries, the discovery rule did not
apply and she was precluded from pursuing her action. 10
Raymond admitted that ... she remembered the assaults and real-
ized that as a child she had mental anguish associated with the sex-
ual abuse. Before her therapy, she also had memories of the events
giving rise to her cause of action and of some injury associated with
those events .... It does not matter that Raymond had not discov-
ered the causal connection to all her injuries, because when Ray-
mond reached the age of majority she knew that she had substantial
damages associated with the sexual abuse.211
The court also stated that "[a]n indecent or sexual assault gives
rise to a suit for mental anguish and entitles the plaintiff to re-
cover substantial damages. '' 212 But, "[i]t is not necessary to know
the total extent of damages that an act causes to begin the running
of the statute of limitations. '213 Presumably, Ms. Raymond would
have been able to pursue her claims if she had alleged she re-
pressed all memory of the facts of the abuse and was thus unaware
of her cause of action.
It is important to note that the Raymond court, unlike the Ty-
son opinion discussed above, 21 4 expressly did "not decide whether
there was objective, verifiable evidence of the original wrongful
act" 215 since the case was dismissed as time barred.
210. Raymond, 737 P.2d at 317.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Martin v. Jansen, 193 P. 674, aff'd en banc, 198 P. 393 (Wash. 1921)).
213. Id. at 317 (citing Streifel v. Hansch, 698 P.2d 570 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 164-77.
215. Raymond, 737 P.2d at 317.
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In 1988, the same court in Kaiser v. Milliman considered and
rejected Wendy Kaiser's request for application of the discovery
doctrine to her sexual abuse claims.218 Ms. Kaiser filed an action
against her father when she was twenty-five years old for injuries
resulting from assaults inflicted when she was between the ages of
two and six. Although Wendy remembered at least one incident of
abuse when she reached the age of majority (which was eighteen in
Washington) and was also aware that she had emotional problems,
she did not make the causal connection between her injuries as an
adult and the childhood sexual assaults until she was in profes-
sional therapy at age twenty-five.217 The court held that the dis-
covery doctrine was not applicable because Ms. Kaiser was aware
she had been sexually assaulted and was aware she suffered inju-
ries within the statute of limitations. The fact she did not discover
the causative element of her action until a point beyond the stat-
ute of limitations did not warrant application of the discovery doc-
trine.218 Unlike the opinion in Raymond,1 9 this court quoted from
Tyson v. Tyson, and ruled that the discovery rule should only be
applied when "there was objective, verifiable evidence of the origi-
nal wrongful act and the resulting physical injury. ' 220 The court
believed that Ms. Kaiser's remembrance of her father's sexual as-
saults was not sufficiently objective to overcome her father's reply
that the assaults never occurred.221
It is the authors' opinion that the flaw throughout the Washing-
ton state cases is the courts' failure to recognize the conflicting is-
sues between the plaintiff's right to commence an action and her
standard of proof once she is permitted to pursue that action.
Whether the plaintiff acted promptly after she discovered that her
adult injuries were the result of childhood sexual assaults, and
whether the sexual assaults were actually inflicted by the person
216. 747 P.2d 1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
217. Id. at 1130-31.
218. At the time of Ms. Kaiser's action, Washington recognized a two-year limitation pe-
riod for assault, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.100 (West 1988), and a three-year period
for other personal injuries, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.080(2) (West 1988). Further,
Washington permitted tolling during minority. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.190 (West
1988). Thus, Ms. Kaiser's claims should have been filed no later than age 21. See Kaiser,
747 P.2d at 1131.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 208-15.
220. Kaiser, 747 P.2d at 1131 (quoting Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1986)
superseded by statute as stated in North Coast Air Servs. Ltd. v. Gromman Corp., 759 P.2d
405 (Wash. 1988).
221. Id. at 1131.
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the plaintiff sued, are both factual issues to be determined by the
trier of fact. In Washington the courts estopped the plaintiffs from
pursuing their causes of action because of a lack of objectively veri-
fiable information. However, whether the plaintiffs' allegations can
be objectively verified should be matters of proof, not matters ap-
plied to the initial question of whether the discovery rule permits
the plaintiff to proceed to the stage of proof of her allegations. The
decisions in Tyson, Kaiser, and Raymond were thankfully abro-
gated by the Washington Legislature in 1988 when it specifically
recognized a tort for childhood sexual abuse.222
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con-
sidered an appeal that was a mixture of type one and type two
cases. In Smith v. Smith225 the court refused to apply the New
York's tolling provisions for insanity to an incest abuse case. The
court affirmed the decision of the district court that thirty-two-
year-old Jeanne Smith could not maintain an action against her
father for sexual assaults that had ceased twenty years prior to fil-
ing her action. Ms. Smith alleged she "was suffering from a post-
traumatic stress disorder which caused her to repress her memories
of the incestuous occurrences of her childhood and disabled her
from instituting litigation which might stimulate a traumatic recall
of the childhood event."224 However, she also admitted that she
was aware that she had been sexually abused by her father and
was aware that the abuse had caused her harm within the statute
of limitations period.22 5 Thus, Ms. Smith was precluded from
maintaining her action under traditional, intentional tort theories
because she was not legally insane as a result of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder.226
222. The new statute expressly provides for application of the discovery rule in cases of
injuries sustained as a result of childhood incest. The Washington legislature provided that
(1) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by any per-
son for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse
shall be commenced within three years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or
condition, or three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act, whichever period ex-
pires later.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
223. 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987).
224. Id. at 12.
225. Id. The court noted that Ms. Smith could not avoid conceding that she was aware of
the sexual assaults within the limitations period because her father, the defendant, was con-
fined to a mental institution when Ms. Smith was ten years old for "the very acts of which
[Ms. Smith] now complains." Id. at 12-13.
226. The court ruled that legal insanity does not apply to a person claiming a post-trau-
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One additional theory under which a survivor of incest has been
entitled to pursue her action beyond the statutory time frame is
fraudulent concealment. In Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, M.D.,227 Su-
san Hildebrand was twenty-six years old when she brought suit
against her father for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and negligent failure to exercise reasonable care with her while she
was a minor. Ms. Hildebrand stated that her father sexually
abused her from age thirteen through age seventeen when she fi-
nally left home.22 s Ms. Hildebrand knew that she had been sexu-
ally abused as a minor and knew that she had suffered depression
and other emotional problems. However,, she equated her adult
emotional problems to the childhood assaults only as a result of
professional therapy at age twenty-four.229 Her physician-father
had previously told Ms. Hildebrand that her depression and emo-
tional problems were due to a chemical imbalance. Therefore, the
court found that her father's diagnosis and medication "can rea-
sonably be interpreted as designed to prevent her from under-
standing or disclosing his alleged abuse of her, or its emotional im-
pact upon her. 230 The court thus permitted Ms. Hildebrand to
pursue her claims despite the fact that her action was filed beyond
the Indiana two-year statute of limitations.23 '
matic neurosis. Instead, legal insanity applies only to "those [persons] 'who are unable to
protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society.'" Id. at 12
(quoting McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (N.Y. 1982)).
227. 736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990); see also Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605 (R.I.
1991) in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island was faced with a case of first impression
applying the delayed discovery rule to a civil sexual assault case. The plaintiff adult daugh-
ters alleged their father forced sexual contact upon them several times per week from 1959
until 1972. The daughters sued in 1991 and alleged they had discovered only recently the
connection between the physical assaults suffered as children and the resulting psychologi-
cal injuries they suffered as adults. Id. at 606. The trial court concluded that the discovery
rule should be available to the plaintiffs and that the statute of limitations did not bar the
case. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
The trial judge was ordered to determine the date the plaintiffs discovered, or with all dili-
gence should have reasonably discovered, the causal connection between the defendant's
alleged acts and the plaintiffs' alleged injuries. After receiving the trial court's findings, the
supreme court would then determine the propriety of applying the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations in the case. Id. at 606-07.
228. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. at 1512.
229. Id. at 1516.
230. Id. at 1524.
231. Id.; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2(1) (Burns 1986).
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V. CONCLUSION
The survivor of incest is not likely to realize the extent of her
injuries immediately after the abuse has ceased. It is often years
later that the harm caused by the egregious actions of the father,
trusted counselor, relative or family friend develops into serious
adult psychological problems. In many cases the survivor is not
within the prescribed statutory limitations period when she be-
comes aware of the fact and cause of her injuries.
Once she recalls the facts of the assaults she must then come to
realize that she is not merely a victim, but a survivor; that the sex-
ual assaults were not her fault but were the result of another's
wrongful conduct; and that her adult problems are manifestations
of another's wrongful acts. A realization of this process supports
application of the discovery rule to the time when the plaintiff dis-
covers both the fact and cause of her injuries.
To provide redress for the "blamelessly ignorant" plaintiff, it is
important that the discovery doctrine be applied. Without applica-
tion of the discovery doctrine, the adult survivors will often not
have a civil redress for 'the wrongs inflicted by childhood sexual
abuse.
Two avenues of approach are available for putting the discovery
doctrine in place. One approach is by statute as adopted by a num-
ber of states.23 2 These statutes, which expressly recognize child-
hood sexual abuse and incest as tort actions, provide for recovery
within a designated period from the point in time when the victim
discovered or reasonably should have discovered the fact and cause
of her injury. The second approach is by judicial recognition of and
application of the discovery doctrine to actions brought under
traditional tort theories for adult injuries that result from child-
hood incestuous abuse.233
Whether by case law or statutory provision, the application of
the discovery doctrine is logical, just and equitable. It provides the
blamelessly ignorant survivor of incest with the threshold determi-
nation to commence her tort action.
232. For a listing of states having statutory discovery rules, see supra note 190.
233. See Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. IIl. 1988), summary judgment
granted, 766 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. IM. 1991); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512
(S.D. Ind. 1990); Daly v. Derrick, 281 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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